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The nation has become one of the most contested concepts of our
times. The multifarious definitions of the nation focus on cultural, po-
litical, psychological, territorial, ethnic, and sociological principles
according to different scholars, politicians, and political activists willing
to shed some light into such a disputed term. Their lack of agreement
suggests a major difficulty in dealing with such a complex phenomenon.
The crux of the matter probably resides close to the link which has been
established between nation and State, and to the common practice of
using the nation as a source of political legitimacy. To be or not to be
recognized as a nation entails different rights for the community which
claims to be one, since being a nation usually implies the attachment to
a particular territory, a shared culture and history, and the vindication of
the right to self-determination. To define a specific community as a na-
tion involves the more or less explicit acceptance of the legitimacy of
the State which claims to represent it, or, if the nation does not posses a
State of its own, it then implicitly acknowledges the nation's right to
self-government involving some degree of political autonomy which
may or may not lead to a claim for independence.
* Reader in Politics, Open University, UK.
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I. DEFINITIONS
The nation, however, cannot be viewed in isolation. I argue that a
clear-cut distinction needs to be drawn between three main concepts:
nation, State, and nationalism. In addition, the nation-state needs to be
defined and further distinguished from these three concepts. By "State,"
taking Weber's definition, I refer to "a human community that (success-
fully) claims the monopoly of the legitimate use of physical force within
a given territory," although not all States have successfully accom-
plished this, and some of them have not even aspired to accomplish it.
By "nation," I refer to a human group conscious of forming a commu-
nity, sharing a common culture and a clearly demarcated territory,
having a common past and a common project for the future, and claim-
ing the right to rule itself. This definition attributes five dimensions to
the nation: psychological or consciousness of forming a group, cultural,
territorial, political and historical. By "nationalism" I mean the senti-
ment of belonging to a community whose members identify with a set
of symbols, beliefs and ways of life, and have the will to decide upon
their common political destiny.2 The nation-state is a modem institution,
characterized by the formation of a kind of State that has the monopoly
of what it claims to be the legitimate use of force within a demarcated
territory and seeks to unite the people subject to its rule by means of
cultural homogenization.
Nation, State, and nationalism form a triad characterized by a con-
stant tension between its three components. This tension can be seen on
two levels. First, changes in the definition of one of the constituents
have the capacity to influence and, to some extent, even alter the defini-
tions of the other two. Second, the eventual emergence of external
factors may alter the very nature of the triad by shifting the balance of
power between its members and even threatening to undermine one of
them at the expense of another.
For instance, if belonging to a nation is defined in terms of common
blood, the definitions of the State and citizenship, as an attribute con-
ferred upon its members, will have to include blood as a sine qua non
condition for membership. Consequently, any nationalist movement
emerging in these specific circumstances will focus upon common
blood as a requisite for exclusion and inclusion in the nation that they
want to defend and promote. In other cases where common ancestry is
replaced by territory or by the will to be a member of a particular nation
as the primary condition for membership of a particular State, the defi-
1. MAX WEBER, FROM MAX WEBER: ESSAYS IN SOCIOLOGY 78 (Hans H. Gerth & C
Wright Mills, trans. and eds., 1946).
2. MONTSERRAT GUIBERNAU, NATIONALISMS 47-48 (1996).
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nition of the nation and the character of nationalism are altered accord-
ingly. Of course, alterations in the definitions of nation, State and
nationalism are not restricted to conditions for belonging or criteria for
membership.
The state's self-definition as a unitary, a federal, or even a multina-
tional political institution holds significant consequences for the peoples
living within its boundaries. Once one of these self-definitions is
adopted by a specific State, it has the capacity to influence the definition
of the nation. This is particularly evident in the case of being confronted
with a State that declares itself to be multinational, thus assuming the
coexistence of more than one nation within its territory. Such a position
entails an automatic distinction between nation and State which chal-
lenges the commonly accepted coincidence between the two. A
multinational State explicitly acknowledges its internal diversity, and, in
so doing, it influences the diverse definitions of nationalism that may
emerge within its territory. First, in these cases, the nationalism instilled
by the State will necessarily involve the acceptance of the diverse na-
tions included within its borders. This type of nationalism tends to focus
on shared constitutional rights and principles as elements able to hold
together an otherwise diverse citizenry. Second, the nationalism emerg-
ing from some of the national minorities included within the State is
strongly influenced by the state's recognition of their status as nations.
The minorities' nationalism is bound to focus on demands for greater
power and resources which will allow them to further the degree of self-
government they enjoy, assuming that they are already entitled to some
political autonomy.
In a similar way, alterations in the definition of nationalism have the
power to impact the definitions of both the State and the nation. There-
fore, a nationalist discourse based upon the rejection, dehumanization,
and portrayal of those who do not belong to the nation as "enemies" and
as a "threat" will feed xenophobia and ethnic hatred. This type of na-
tionalism is likely to foster a narrow definition of the nation based upon
the exclusion of the different and the belief in the superiority of one's
own nation above all others. A State endorsing this sort of nationalism is
likely to base its policy on the marginalization or sometimes even the
elimination of "others" within its territory, and/or the pursuit of a con-
sistent assimilation policy. This type of State often engages in conflicts
with other States as a result of an aggressive economic and/or territorial
expansionist policy.
In considering the second level of the relation between the compo-
nents of the triad, we examine how external factors may alter its nature.
Here we are confronted with radical transformations able to alter the
1253Sumnmer 20041
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more or less stable equilibrium existing between the components of the
triad by affecting their relationship at a structural level well above the
particular situations considered when analyzing individual cases.
At present, the main challenge to the relationship between the com-
ponents of the triad concerns the radical and rapid transformations
altering the traditional nature of the State. The proliferation of suprana-
tional institutions, the increasing number of multinational corporations,
and the emergence of substate nationalist movements contrive a novel
political scenario in which the traditional role of the State is being un-
dermined in a fundamental way. The signs of this have already become
apparent; the radicalization of State nationalism, the proliferation of
ethnic and national conflicts, and the State's resistance to give up sub-
stantial aspects of its sovereignty represent but a few examples which
hint at the State's urgent need to recast its nature. At this moment in
time, we are witnessing the rise of what I call "nations without States"
as potential new political actors able to capture and promote sentiments
of loyalty, solidarity and community among individuals who seem to
have developed a growing need for identity. Sound political and eco-
nomic arguments may also be invoked in trying to account for the
relevance that nations without states may acquire in the foreseeable fu-
ture.
II. NATIONS WITHOUT STATES
By "nations without States" I refer to nations which, in spite of hav-
ing their territories included within the boundaries of one or more
States, by and large do not identify with them.3 The members of a nation
lacking a State of their own regard the State containing them as alien,
and maintain a separate sense of national identity generally based upon
a common culture, history, attachment to a particular territory and the
explicit wish to rule themselves. Self-determination is sometimes under-
stood as political autonomy, in other cases it stops short of
independence and often involves the right to secede. Catalonia, Quebec,
Scotland, the Basque Country, and Flanders represent but a few nations
without States currently demanding further autonomy. It could be ar-
gued that some of these nations do have some kind of State of their own
since a substantial number of powers have been devolved to their re-
gional parliaments. But, because in my view, political autonomy or even
federation fall short of independence since they tend to exclude foreign
3. See MONTSERRAT GUIBERNAU, NATIONS WITHOUT STATES (1999).
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and economic policy, defense and constitutional matters, it continues to
make sense to refer to them as nations without States.
A nation without State, as the term indicates, is based upon the exis-
tence of a nation, that is, a community endowed with a stable but
dynamic core containing a set of factors which have generated the
emergence of a specific national identity. The State, that is, the political
institution with which the nation should ideally identify, is missing. This
creates a picture in which we have the cultural unit but lack the corre-
sponding political institution regarded as legitimate by the members of
the nation. The relationship between nation and State seems to have
shifted from a time in which the State and its role in nation-building was
given pre-eminence. In contrast, contemporary nationalist movements in
nations without States are actively involved in "State-building." We
should note, however, that the State they seek to create differs from the
classical model of State.4
The main qualities of the nation-state which somehow favored the
assimilation of otherwise culturally diverse citizens were: its power to
confer rights and duties upon its citizens; to provide for their basic
needs, a function which since the Second World War materialized in the
establishment of more or less generous welfare systems; and to maintain
order in society while controlling the economy, defense, immigration
and foreign policy, education and communication systems. The nation-
state has traditionally based its legitimacy upon the idea that it repre-
sents the nation, in spite of the fact that often the State, once created,
had to engage in nation-building processes aimed at the forced assimila-
tion of its citizens. It now becomes apparent that, in many cases, these
processes have largely failed; the re-emergence of nationalist move-
ments in nations without States proves it. At present, the State seems to
become increasingly unable to fulfill its citizens' needs and conse-
quently the citizens turn away from it and search for alternative
institutions.
Most so called nation-states are not constituted by a single nation
which is coextensive with the State;5 internal diversity is the rule. The
nation-state, after a long process of consolidation that has involved the
construction of a symbolic image of the community endowed with a
particular language and culture, and the creation of symbols and rituals
destined to emphasize its unique character and the fixing of territorial
borders, is being forced to respond to challenges from within.
4. See Montserrat Guibernau, Globalization and the Nation-State, in MONTSERRAT
GUIBERNAU & JOHN HUTCHINSON, UNDERSTANDING NATIONALISM 242 passim (2001)
5. GUIBERNAU, supra note 2, at 47.
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The nations or parts of nations included within a single State do not
share similar levels of national awareness. What is more, while some
will define themselves as nations, others will be happy to be referred to
as provinces or regions. Nations are not unique and fixed, and through-
out history it is possible to record the disintegration of some nations
which have played a prominent role during a particular period and the
creation of new ones.
The State has a strong tendency to absorb functions and a great re-
luctance to delegate control over any of the tasks it considers as an
integral part of its sovereignty. The argument for state centralization is
closely connected to the idea of state sovereignty understood as full con-
trol over all matters concerning the social, political and economic life of
the citizens living within its boundaries. The increasing number of in-
ternational organizations, multinational companies, supranational social
movements and the technical sophistication of modem warfare are cur-
rently challenging this classic concept of state sovereignty. The State is
exposed to pressure from above while at the same time it lays itself open
to increasing internal strain to modify its traditional centralist nature and
acknowledges the existence of territorially circumscribed cultural com-
munities within itself which show a varying degree of national self-
consciousness and put forward different socio-political demands. The
origin of most of these communities can be traced back to an era previ-
ous to the founding moment of the nation-state when diversity was
generally diluted under the centralist and homogenizing practices of a
then incipient nation-state.
The nationalism of nations without States is closely connected to
two interrelated factors: the intensification of globalization processes
and the transformations affecting the nation-state. This type of national-
ism emerges as a socio-political movement that defends the right of
peoples to decide upon their own political destiny. Pressure for change
and the nature of political demands are not homogeneous and depend
upon each case, but what all these movements seem to share is the will
to develop their specific culture and language, whenever it exists, and
the desire to feel represented by the institutions deciding upon their fu-
ture. The number of people involved in the movement can measure the
strength of this type of nationalism; thus, a massive following is more
difficult to ignore if the State wants to maintain its credibility as a de-
mocratic institution.
A key feature when considering nations without States is the degree
of dissatisfaction felt by their members concerning their present situa-
tion. They tend to regard the State within which they are included as
"alien," as an "obstruction" to the development of their nation, or as a
1256 [Vol. 25:1251
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"burden" that takes a great deal of their resources and does not provide
them with sufficient benefits. The articulation of such feelings provokes
the emergence of nationalist movements with differing political aims
ranging from devolution and autonomy to secession and independence.
Such movements are based upon the denunciation of an unsatisfactory
situation related to economic, social, political, or security matters
stemming from the relationship between the State and its national mi-
norities. The particular nature of the State, which differs in each case,
determines the status of the national minority, while the strength of the
minority's nationalist movement heavily influences a possible re-
shaping of its relationship with the state.
This paper considers cultural recognition, political autonomy, and
federation as three possible political responses to the nationalism of na-
tions without States. Independence may indeed be the outcome of
nationalist pressure, but in what follows I shall focus upon these three
alternatives which are capable of accommodating the national minori-
ties' demands without, in principle, leading to secession. Cultural
recognition, political autonomy and federation presuppose the accep-
tance of democracy understood in a broad sense and the readiness of the
State to recognize varying degrees of difference within itself. There are
many intermediate solutions to the three main political scenarios I wish
to study. In this sense, I will consider regionalization, devolution, and
decentralization as variations either within cultural recognition or politi-
cal autonomy depending upon each case. A further political response
refers to a state of affairs in which the national minority's existence is
not recognized as such by the State or States containing it. This is what I
call "denial and repression." In these occasions, lack of recognition is
often accompanied by the active implementation of policies destined to
homogenize the population and to eradicate the cultural and political
specific traits of the minority. There are many ways in which repression
can be exerted ranging from social and political to overt military meas-
ures.
In what follows, I examine different political scenarios and feasible
solutions to the nationalism of nations without States in Western coun-
tries. Although I will make occasional references to some post-colonial
societies, I am aware that for these references to be fully accurate, a
careful analysis of what colonialism means, and how the concepts of
nation, State, and nationalism were exported to these areas and appro-
priated by the new local elites to fit into a radically distinct environment
from that of the West where they had originated, should be included.
But this is an area of study that is far beyond the scope of the present
Summer 2004] 1257
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paper. A further case not considered in this paper concerns whether First
Nations could be regarded as a type of nations without States.6
IlI. CULTURAL RECOGNITION
The acknowledgment of certain cultural traits as specific character-
istics of a territorially-based national minority which the state may refer
to as "region," "province," or "d6partement" stands as a soft option in
the state's process of recognizing its internal diversity. Two main issues
need to be considered before exploring this option.
First, cultural recognition presupposes the existence of a unitary
State which excludes the possibility of considering its internal diversity
as the outcome of more than one nation living under the umbrella of a
single political institution. Almost invariably, the State promotes a
common language and culture through a more or less efficient national
education system. In this context, internal differences do not pose a
threat to the state's integrity; rather, they are incorporated into the state's
culture, and are considered as part of it.
Second, cultural recognition seems to work wherever national mi-
norities have a weak sense of identity, or are unwilling to or prevented
from articulating social and political movements in defense of their
specificity. But, how are we to explain a weak national self-
consciousness? In my view, three main causes can be identified: (1) a
successful assimilation program implemented by the State that has re-
sulted in a considerable degree of integration of the national minority
involved; (2) a situation in which the national minority has been re-
pressed over a substantial period of time, taking into account that
repression can be exerted in a myriad of ways that do not necessarily
involve the use of physical force; and (3) historical accident. This refers
to unspecified circumstances which can be considered entirely as a mat-
ter of chance. For example, the death or lack of a successor to the crown
and the need to find a new monarch outside the nation; a high influx of
migrants taking over the economy and, later, politics; or the massive
migration of young members of the nation forced to find work else-
where.
Cultural recognition involves a unitary State which does not dele-
gate its sovereign powers, except on very specific issues, as was the case
in Scotland where it maintained its separate education system, religion
(kirk), and civil law.
6. For an analysis of nations and nationalism in Native America, see GUIBERNAU,
supra note 3, at 67-82.
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Cultural recognition involves a minimal degree of decentralization,
if any. The citizens of the State exert their sovereignty in general elec-
tions which affect the life of the entire population, the region is never
considered as a separate entity enjoying the right to directly decide upon
matters affecting it (demos). There are no regional elections; sovereignty
is exercised at a single level and it is not devolved. The integrity of the
State is well preserved since the possibility of internal challenges is
ruled out by a firm unitary state structure.
The State may decide to appoint a special representative for the area
in charge of the distribution of state subsidies and the administration of
the region according to the state's legislation. This person is usually ac-
countable to the parliament about issues concerning the region. The
state's nominee is not elected by the region's inhabitants, as members of
the regional government and the president himself would be if there
were political autonomy. This has been the case in Scotland up to 1999
when the first members to the newly created Scottish Parliament were
elected. In Scotland, a Secretary of State was appointed in the first post-
union Government (1707). After 1745, however, no such appointment
was made; while responsibility for Scotland during the majority of the
ensuing period lay with the Home Secretary, most of the effective politi-
cal power was exercised by the Lord Advocate. This system lasted until
1885 when the office of Secretary of Scotland was created, the status of
which was enhanced in 1926 to that of Secretary of State.
In addition, cultural recognition usually involves the protection and
promotion of the regional language, if there is one, and culture. It is
relatively easy and uncompromising for the State to sponsor some folk-
lore events which reflect the specific traditions of the area and present
them as a constitutive part of the nation-state's broad culture. Such
manifestations are aimed at pleasing those members of the region who
consider themselves satisfied with this level of recognition.
The protection and encouragement of a regional language that is
only spoken by a small minority or relegated to a private sphere, is more
controversial. The degree of controversy is directly connected to the
strength and resources allocated to this end, and to the social impact of
an increasing use of the language in the public sphere. Wherever the
regional language has been lost, difference is placed upon other distinc-
tive features of the community such as law, religion, but undoubtedly,
wherever language still exists, it becomes one of the most prominent
features of identity.
The recognition of internal difference, be it in the form of cultural
recognition, political autonomy or federation, is bound to contrive oppo-
sition from those who sustain a closed imaged of the State as a political
Summer 2004] 1259
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institution that aims at the annihilation of difference within itself. In
many multinational States we encounter what I call a "colonization of
the regions." By this I mean a process of active assimilation of regions
to the mainstream culture and language. The presence of the state's rep-
resentatives in the administration and the army contributes to the
consolidation of such policies.
Furthermore, a subtle and to a certain degree unintended form of
colonization of poor areas occurs when a substantial number of second
residences belonging to people from outside the region who enjoy a
higher standard of living and benefit from the region's lower prices in
the housing market and services takes place. The impact of their pres-
ence depends very much on the number of new "part-time" residents. A
few people are easier to assimilate into the uses, traditions, and even the
language of a particular region. Similarly, the various attitudes of those
entering certain communities through their second homes make a great
difference. Thus, some people are respectful of regional cultures, while
others are indifferent to them. There are also those who clearly despise
regional cultures as inferior, primitive, or retrograde in an attempt to
justify the region's backwardness. In these circumstances, the autoch-
thonous people's reactions towards the "newcomers" range from open
hostility, which sometimes can lead to violence, to admiration and a
sense of inferiority.
IV. POLITICAL AUTONOMY
Political autonomy refers to a situation in which a unitary State de-
cides to implement a certain degree of decentralization by devolving
some of its powers to all or some of its constituent regions, provinces or
nations-the terminology varies a great deal depending upon the indi-
vidual's perspective. Some key concepts connected with the idea of
political autonomy are: subsidiarity, decentralization, and devolution.
They all refer to the transformation of a unitary State into a political
institution able to delegate some functions while still retaining a strong
core of attributes. These concepts can be understood as a means to
deepen democracy by bringing decision-making processes closer to
those who will be directly affected by them. The main argument for de-
centralization is the implicit belief that transferring certain functions to
substate institutions with a territorial basis could increase efficiency and
legitimacy. However, although some practical reasons could be invoked
for defending the partial autonomy of certain areas within a single State,




The combination of democracy and Woodrow Wilson's 1918 princi-
ple of a people's right to self-determination has so far materialized in
different political arrangements attempting to acknowledge both criteria
while preserving the nation-state's integrity. Political autonomy should
be regarded as a state's response to its national minorities' nationalism
which goes beyond cultural recognition. It usually emerges as the result
of pressure exerted by the national minorities involved and it is never a
smooth process. Political autonomy requires the amendment of the
state's constitution to specify the degree of decentralization and the spe-
cific powers that will be transferred to the regions. It also requires
establishing clear guiding principles for the allocation of the resources
that will make political autonomy possible. Sovereignty is not shared by
the constituent parts of the State as it is expected in a federation. Instead
of this, the State transfers some of its functions to newly created re-
gional institutions with or without a previous historical past that must
always be accountable to it. Matters relating to culture and welfare seem
to be easier to transfer than those concerning taxation, security, and in-
ternational relations. The latter, if ever ceded, are always partial and
evolve under close supervision by state agents and institutions. There is
not a fixed rule of how much power should be devolved when autonomy
is conferred upon some regions, which explains why the concept and
content of this political arrangement vary substantially when applied to
different political environments.
For instance, Catalonia, in northern Spain, shares Scotland's history
of having been independent until the early eighteenth century and then
subsequently integrated within a larger State. A separate sense of iden-
tity based on a particular culture, which in the case of Catalonia
includes a distinct language, and the desire for some type of political
recognition have been at the heart of Catalan as well as in Scottish na-
tionalist demands.
A. Catalonia
Fundamental to the history of Catalan nationalism is the fact that
Catalonia became a nation without a State after a long period up to
1714, during which it had enjoyed its own political institutions and
laws.7
Catalonia enjoyed a certain degree of autonomy under the adminis-
trative government of the Mancomunitat (1913-1923), 8 which was
suppressed in 1923 after the coup d'&tat of Miguel Primo de Rivera, 9
7. ALBERT BALCELLS, CATALAN NATIONALISM 15 (Jacqueline Hall, trans., 1996).
8. Id. at 67-69.
9. Id. at 83.
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and under the Generalitat (1931-1938),0 which was abolished by Gen-
eral Francisco Franco's decree of April 5, 1938." After Franco's
dictatorship, Catalonia recovered its autonomous government, Generali-
tat (1977),"2 and sanctioned a new Statute of Autonomy (1979)."3
During the Francoist regime (1939-75), nationalism and democracy
stood together as part and parcel of the Catalan and Basque demands for
the transformation of Spain into a democratic State able to recognize
diversity within itself and ready to alter its recalcitrant centralist na-
ture.' 4 After Franco's death in 1975, the national question became a
pressing matter and a compromise among all political forces engaged in
the process of drawing up a new democratic constitution for Spain had
to be achieved.'5 The makers of the constitution opted for a model based
upon symmetry, what has been called cafj para todos, or "coffee for
everyone,' 6 and instead of directly responding to the nationalist claims
of Catalonia and the Basque Country as nations, they decided to imple-
ment a system that would allow the creation of seventeen autonomous
communities, some historically and culturally distinct-Catalonia, the
Basque Country and Galicia-others artificially created where no sense
of a separate identity had ever existed-La Rioja and Madrid, among
many others.'7 Yet, while Catalonia, the Basque Country and Galicia
could immediately initiate the process towards full autonomy, other re-
gions had to fulfill a five year "restricted autonomy" period before
initiating it.'" Once full autonomy is achieved, however, the constitution
makes no distinction between the communities. '9 The constitution as-
sumes the indissoluble unity of Spain while recognizing and
guaranteeing the right to autonomy of its nationalities and regions. 20
Each community has a regional legislative assembly consisting of a
single chamber.2' Deputies are elected on the basis of proportional rep-
resentation, and usually the leader of the majority party or coalition
10. MONTSERRAT GUIBERNAU, CATALAN NATIONALISM: FRANCOISM, TRANSITION AND
DEMOCRACY 34-36 (2004).
11. Montserrat Guibemau, Spain: Catalonia and the Basque Country, in MICHAEL
O'NEILL & DENNIS AUSTIN, DEMOCRACY AND CULTURAL DIVERSITY 56 (2000).
12. BALCELLS, supra note 7, at 172; see also PAUL PRESTON, JUAN CARLOS : EL REY
DE UN PUEBLO 452-53 (2003).
13. GUIBERNAU, supra note 10, at 76.
14. Jos6 L. Cebridn, La experiencia del periodo constituyente, in ESPAI&A 1975-1980:
CONFLICTOS Y LOGROS DE LA DEMOCRACIA 13, 13-24 (Jos6 L. Cagigao et al. eds., 1982).
15. GUIBERNAU, supra note 10, at 72.
16. Guibernau, supra note 11, at 61.
17. Id.
18. JORDI SOL9 TURA, NACIONALIDADES Y NACIONALISMOS EN ESPA&A: AUTONOMfAS,
FEDERALISMO, AUTODETERMINACI6N 109 (1985).
19. CONSTITUCI6N [CE] arts. 143, 151 (Spain).
20. Id. at art. 2.
21. See generally id. at arts. 143-58.
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assumes the presidency of the community.22 The president heads a re-
gional executive of ministers in charge of departments which mostly, but
not always, follow the Spanish national pattern.23 In many ways, the
autonomous governments act as States. '4 In Catalonia and the Basque
Country, for example, they provide services in education, health, cul-
ture, housing, local transport, and agriculture; and they have even gained
control of their autonomous police force. The Spanish Government
holds exclusive jurisdiction over defense, the administration of justice,
international relations and general economic planning.25 A Compensa-
tion Fund administered by the government allocates special resources to
poorer regions and is intended to promote equilibrium and solidarity
26among them.
B. Scotland
Scotland enjoyed political independence until 1707, and the survival
of many of its institutions, notably law, religion and education, after the
union contributed to the preservation of its singular identity as a nation
within the United Kingdom.27
Scotland has endured a long and complicated process towards self-
determination. In the 1979 Referendum, the Scots voted in favor of the
Labour Government proposals to establish a Scottish Assembly.28 The
Act was repealed because a special majority provision required that at
least forty percent of the registered electorate should vote in favor. Only
32.9 percent of the electorate voted positively in the referendum.
Since 1988, the Scottish Constitutional Convention comprising La-
bour, Liberal Democrats, Nationalists, churches, unions and other civic
groups has been campaigning for change. In 1995, they published a plan
for a Scottish Parliament.29 In the light of the unhappy memories of ear-
lier attempts at major constitutional reform, the convention opposed an
establishing referendum considering it as a high risk strategy. ° Once in
power, the Labour government decided to hold a referendum (Septem-
ber 11, 1997) with a positive outcome; seventy-four percent of the Scots
22. See generally id.
23. See generally id.
24. See id. art. 148.
25. Id. at art. 149.
26. Id. at art. 158.
27. JOHN DUNCAN MACKIE, A HISTORY OF SCOTLAND 263 (Bruce Lenman & Geoffrey
Parker, eds., 2d ed. 1978).
28. THE SCOTTISH OFFICE, SCOTLAND'S PARLIAMENT para. 1.4 (1997), available at
http://www.scotland.gov.uk/govemment/devolution/scpa-00.asp.
29. THE SCOTTISH OFFICE, supra note 28, at para. 1.5.
30. Lindsay Paterson, Scottish Democracy and Scottish Utopias: The First Year of the
Scottish Parliament, in SCOTTISH AFFAIRS 45 (Autumn 2000).
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voted for a Scottish Parliament and sixty-three percent voted to give it
tax-varying powers.3' This has transformed Scotland's status within
Britain. The Scots now elect their own representatives in the Scottish
Parliament; the first elections took place in May, 1999.32 The First Min-
ister heads the Scottish Executive and is appointed by the Queen on the
advice of the Presiding Officer after the Scottish Parliament has nomi-
nated a candidate, who will normally be the leader of the party able to
command the majority support of the Scottish Parliament.33 The affirma-
tive referendum result cannot deliver constitutional entrenchment, but it
might reinforce its moral and political legitimacy. Ultimately, Scotland's
Parliament will have to secure its future in the U.K. Constitution by con-
vincing the population of its relevance to their lives.
The British Prime Minister, Tony Blair, in his preface to Scotland's
White Paper referred to Scotland as "a proud historic nation in the
United Kingdom,, 34 thus acknowledging the multinational character of
the British State. Throughout the paper, Scottish devolution was pre-
sented as part of the government's comprehensive program of
constitutional reform destined to strengthen the United Kingdom. 35 Scot-
land remains an integral part of the United Kingdom, and the Queen
continues to be Head of State of the United Kingdom. Westminster is
and will remain sovereign. The Scottish Parliament has lawmaking
powers over a wide range of matters which affect Scotland. Westminster
retains powers and responsibilities for: the constitution of the United
Kingdom; U.K. foreign policy including relations with Europe; U.K.
defense and national security; the stability of the U.K.'s fiscal, economic
and monetary system; employment legislation; social security; and most
aspects of transport safety and regulation.36
V. FEDERATION
The main difference between federation, as a form of government of
a country in which power is divided between one central and several
regional governments, and political autonomy lies in the much higher
degree of decentralization that is constitutionally established and guar-
anteed whenever a federal structure is set up. In objective terms and
31. Michael O'Neill, Great Britain: From Dicey to Devolution, 53 PARLIAMENTARY
AFFAIRS 69, 78 (2000).
32. Graham Leicester, Scotland, in THE STATE AND THE NATIONS 13, 15 (R Hazell ed.
2000).
33. See generally THE SCOTTISH OFFICE, supra note 28, at paras. 2.6, 4.2.
34. Tony Blair, Preface to THE SCOTTISH OFFICE, supra note 28, at v.
35. THE SCOTTISH OFFICE, supra note 28, at para. 4.5.
36. Id. at para. 3.3.
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from the point of view of the degree of self-determination, a nation
without State can enjoy without becoming independent, this is the most
advantageous arrangement. However, there is not a sole interpretation of
federalism, or, at least, there are remarkable differences between differ-
ent federal structures. In Graham Smith's view, federalism is both a
political ideology and an institutional arrangement.37 As a political ide-
ology, it assumes that the ideal organization of human affairs is best
reflected in the celebration of diversity through unity. As an institutional
arrangement, federations vary widely in their content depending upon
historical, economic, social and political circumstances.
Because federalism represents an ideological commitment, the mere
creation of federal structures does not necessarily lead to a federalism
which assumes both respect for diversity and a strong commitment to
accept the union of the federation. In some cases, political leaders'
commitment to federalism produces a "federalizing" influence when it
comes to the articulation of the State, without arriving at federation.
Federation embodies a particular articulation of political power
within a clearly demarcated territory, which is informed by the desire to
acknowledge, protect, and encourage diversity within, while at the same
time maintaining the territorial integrity of the State. The constituent
units of a federation, as Burgess writes, are not mere local authorities
subordinate to a dominant central power; "[o]n the contrary, they them-
selves are states with states rights. ' 38 As Elazar puts it, "the very essence
of federation as a particular form of union is self-rule plus shared rule. 39
At the center of the federalist idea lies the assumption of the worth
and validity of diversity. For this reason federations have often proved
highly useful political tools in protecting national minorities concen-
trated in particular territorial areas within the federal State. In the case
of Switzerland, most cantons had been established according to the cul-
tural and linguistic specificity of their inhabitants. A similar point could
be made about Quebec, as the only French enclave in North America,
and one of the most active nations without States in struggling to secure
its linguistic and cultural development, in principle, within the Canadian
federation.
Quite often there is a tension between some members of the federa-
tion's desire to expand the scope of self-determination and the state's
urgency to increase federal control. This tension varies in each case and
37. Graham Smith, Mapping the Federal Condition: Ideology, Political Practice and
Social Justice, in FEDERALISM: THE MULTIETHNIC CHALLENGE 4 (Graham Smith ed., 1995).
38. Michael Burgess, Federalism and Federation Reappraisal, in COMPARATIVE FED-
ERALISM AND FEDERATION: COMPETING TRADITIONS AND FUTURE DIRECTIONS 3, 5 (Michael
Burgess & Alain G. Gagnon eds., 1993).
39. DAVID ELAZAR, EXPLORING FEDERALISM 12 (1987).
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its intensity depends a great deal on the reasons which prompted the
creation of the federation. Ideally, federations should be the outcome of
an agreement between independent States which freely decide to start a
federal project, which allows them to shoulder common interests jointly
while dealing separately with their domestic affairs. Quite often, how-
ever, federations are born out of the pressure exerted by territorially
circumscribed ethnic groups that are dissatisfied with the treatment they
receive by the unitary state containing them, and have enough power to
force its transformation. This would be the case in Belgium, where a
strong Flemish nationalist movement has progressively pushed for the
recognition of its specificity within a once unitary Belgian State, which
has recently turned into a federation to accommodate Flanders' national-
ist demands. In other cases, federations do not respond to pressure from
below, but are created from above. The Soviet Union and India illustrate
this point.
An exception to this is the regionalization of the German political
system and the role of the lander. Gunlicks argues that German federal-
ism today does not reflect a society divided by significant ethnic, social,
cultural, or religious tension; rather, it is designed to reduce the power
of the central government and guarantee a stable democracy.40 This ex-
plains the greater emphasis which the German Basic Law places on the
sharing of powers, responsibilities and resources, when compared, for
example, with the Constitution of the United States which stipulates a
separation of powers between the federation and the states.4' In Ger-
many, federal and ldnder governments are forced to collaborate by a
system of joint policymaking or "interlocking politics. ' '4- Benz argues
that the cultural or historical basis of the lander is rather weak due to
the varied German history throughout which the territorial patchwork
was in constant flux. 4 He emphasizes the role of the two World Wars in
overturning the territorial boundaries of the State and its parts. He
writes:
After the Second World War, the regional structures of the Ger-
man state were re-established in a territorial setting which has
been primarily defined by the artificially created occupation
zones. The lInder which formed the Federal Republic after
1949, as well as those which existed in the GDR until 1952 and
40. See generally Arthur B. Gunlicks, Introduction: Federalism and Intergovernmental
Relations in West Germany, a Fortieth Year Appraisal, in PUBLIUS 1 passim (Fall 1989).
41. See id.
42. See id.
43. Arthur Benz, German regions in the European Union, in REGIONS IN EUROPE 111,
113 (Patrick Le Ga~s & Christian Lequesne, eds., 1998).
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which were re-established in 1990, were for the most part
pragmatic creations of the Allies and lacked traditions."
Benz argues that cultural regions exist but they are more fiction than
reality from a political point of view since the lander do not coincide
41with them, except in very few cases.
The territorial grouping of its citizens is a major feature of a federa-
tion. In King's words: "what is distinctive about federations is not the
fact that the people are viewed as sovereign, but that the expression of
this sovereignty is tied to the existence and entrenchment of regional,
territorial units."' Thus, federation is a useful device in the articulation
of large political institutions formed out of the will of several independ-
ent founding units, as it was the case in Canada, which is regarded, at
least by Quebecois nationalists, as the merging of two founding nations,
one of French and the other of English culture and language. But, as I
have already mentioned, federation is also instrumental in responding to
the claims for self-determination of nations without States.
Yet, the role of federation in a multiethnic or in a multinational so-
ciety where cultural groupings are non-territorial requires a different
approach. The Austro-Marxists, Otto Bauer and Karl Renner, addressed
this subject by trying to establish valid channels of representation for
the numerous ethnic groups scattered around the Austro-Hungarian em-
pire.4' They suggested the creation of non-territorial based institutions
through which ethnic groups could be represented and find institutional
support. Once more, this emphasizes the main aim of federation, that
is, the preservation of diversity within unity as a feature present in
Lenin's Soviet Union, Nehru's India, Trudeau's Canada or even, as
Smith points out, in Delors' European Union. ' Diversity and unity, not
uniformity, are two constituents of federalism that are constantly being
negotiated in a federation. Centralization and decentralization also ex-
press a core feature in defining federations that should be considered as
an expression of democratic practice.
Federation does not eliminate conflict. To a certain extent, it could
be argued that the acknowledgment of diversity is in itself a source of
conflict, but as Burgess stresses, this "does not have to be conceived as a
44. Id.
45. Id.
46. Preston King, Federation and Representation, in COMPARATIVE FEDERALISM AND
FEDERATION 94, 96 (Michael Burgess &Alain G. Gagnon eds., 1993).
47. Smith, supra note 37, at 6.
48. Id.
49. See id. at 7.
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weakness."5° The success of federal systems is not to be measured in
terms of the elimination of social conflicts but instead, in their capacity
to regulate and manage such conflicts." Federations seek to resolve con-
flict through democratic means, by encouraging tolerance and respect
for ethnic diversity. This is why federations cannot be the result of force
or an imposition from above. Awareness of the extremely complicated
process of creating a federal State which will defend diversity and pro-
mote a sentiment of union between its constituents becomes crucial to
secure and maintain its legitimacy.
In Kriek's view, the main dangers threatening federations are: (1)
the possibility that a cultural or religious minority will exceed its oppo-
sition role and end up calling for secession; (2) the dominant position of
certain groups within the federation holding enough power to push for
centralization, a threat which could be avoided by the creation of strong
regional or group parties; and (3) the dependence of one constituent on
others for its resources, a factor capable of provoking either unitary
trends or separatist movements. Consequently financial autonomy is
usually regarded as a highly desirable characteristic of the units forming
a federation."
To prevent disintegration, federations need to combine a strong but
minimal federal government with a genuine policy of decentralization
and respect for its members. A rational division of functions and powers
is decisive to establish an effective coordination system able to avoid a
redundant bureaucracy. Decisions need to be taken collectively and the
relations between the federal State and its constituents clearly estab-
lished in a constitution sanctioned by all. A State may adopt some
federal elements, but it cannot be referred to as a federation unless the
federal principle is stated in its constitution. Once federation is estab-
lished, in principle, all its components hold symmetric rights and duties.
But symmetry is a feature which is currently being questioned in several
federations, such as Quebec.
A. Quebec
Quebec, one of the ten provinces of Canada, considers itself distinct
from the other provinces. It enjoys a specific French culture and lan-
guage, together with a separate historical tradition, and has developed a
strong sense of identity closely linked to a flourishing nationalist
50. Michael Burgess, The Political Uses of Federalism, in COMPARATIVE FEDERALISM
AND FEDERATION 15, 20 (Michael Burgess & Alain G. Gagnon eds., 1993).
51. Id. at 18.
52. D.J. KRIEK, FEDERALISM: THE SOLUTION? 30 (1992).
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movement.53 Quebec's demand to be recognized as a "distinct society"
within Canada exemplifies a claim for asymmetry founded upon a bicul-
tural and bilingual conception of Canada. The recognition of the right to
self-determination of indigenous peoples within the Canadian territory
adds further pressure to explore asymmetric forms of federation and
alter the traditional conception of Canada.
In my view, federations should be regarded as a dynamic process
which evolves as a result of internal as well as external transformations
concerning its constituents. Substantial changes can be identified in the
case of Canada, especially since the 1960s "Quiet Revolution" took
place in Quebec, awakening a nationalist movement that denounced the
second class treatment received by French Canadians within the federa-
tion.54 Education, employment and language appeared as three major
areas in which French Canadians faced discrimination.55 The 1969 Offi-
cial Languages Act granted equal status to French and English in federal
institutions, ensured federal services in both languages nationwide, and
established the Office of the Commissioner of Official Languages to
monitor implementation. 6 The same year, the Royal Commission on
Bilingualism and Biculturalism revealed that the cultural and linguistic
privileges of the English minority in Quebec were combined with a con-
siderably better economic situation.57 The average English male in the
labor force earned just under 50 percent more than the average Quebe-
cois male.58 Unilingual anglophone males in Quebec were portrayed as
the most privileged group in all Canada. 9 The public exposure of the
inferior status of the Quebecois sparked nationalist feelings and contrib-
uted to the reinvigoration of the nationalist movement.6°
The constant activity of a rising Quebecois nationalism propitiated
some transformations in the treatment of French Canadians-
progressively referred to as Quebecois-thus territorially circumscrib-
ing them. In 1971 Pierre Trudeau, then Prime Minister, declared Canada
to be a multicultural state, 61 a measure highly disputed by Quebecois
53. For a history of Quebec, its politics and policy, see Guy LACHAPELLE ET AL., THE
QUEBEC DEMOCRACY: STRUCTURES, PROCESSES AND POLICIES (1993).
54. For an historical perspective on the Canadian federation, see Lloyd Brown-John,
The Meech Lake Accord in Historical Perspective, in CANADIAN FEDERALISM: PAST, PRESENT
AND FUTURE 176 (Michael Burgess ed., 1990).
55. Alain G. Gagnon, Canada: Unity and Diversity, 53 PARLIAMENTARY AFFAIRS 12,
19 (2000).
56. JOHN E CONWAY, DEBTS TO PAY: ENGLISH CANADA AND QUEBEC FROM THE CON-
QUEST TO THE REFERENDUM 70 (1992).
57. Id. at 73.
58. Id.
59. Id. at 74.
60. Gagnon, supra note 55, at 19-20.
61. Id. at 19.
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circles which argued that multiculturalism was an instrument to water
down their nationalist claims and the primarily bilingual and bicultural
nature of the Canadian federation.62
The inclusion of a constitutional amendment that affects Quebec,
the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms, was enacted in 1982
when Canada patriated its constitution without the consent of the people
of Quebec through their representatives in the provincial assembly.
63
This constituted an injustice from the Quebecois perspective because it
violated one of the fundamental rules of federation: what affects all
must be agreed to by all or by their representatives. As Tully empha-
sizes, "[a]lthough the Supreme Court ruled that the convention would be
breached, nine provinces and the federal government, all of whose con-
sent was given, proceeded without the consent of the Quebec Assembly,
and with its express dissent, even though Quebec was affected the most.
This was unprecedented." 6 Since then, several attempts have been made
to solve this anomalous situation. In 1987 under the auspices of Prime
Minister Brian Mulroney, the premiers of the ten provinces drafted the
Meech Lake Accord which increased provincial power and contained a
clause in which Quebec was defined as a "distinct society" within the
Canadian federation. Much concern and unease emerged about the
meaning and significance of the term "distinct society" exclusively ap-
plied to Quebec. The accord attracted growing opposition and it finally
collapsed in June, 1990.66
In 1991, constitutional negotiations reopened, and in 1992 the pre-
miers of the nine English speaking provinces drafted the Charlottetown
67Agreement. It substantially increased provincial powers and weakened
the federal government, while granting Quebec a "distinct society"
status. Decentralization went further than it did in the Meech Lake Ac-
cord. In the Charlottetown Agreement, the so called "Canada clause"
proclaimed the "equality of the provinces," Canada's "linguistic dual-
ity," and proposed to entrench the inherent right of aboriginal self-
government in the constitution.6 ' The most irreparable damage to the
Charlottetown Agreement resulted from the stand adopted by the Native
Women's Association of Canada. 69 Their major concerns were the exclu-
62. CONWAY, supra note 56, at 93.
63. Gagnon, supra note 55, at 21.
64. James Tully, Let's Talk: the Quebec Referendum and the Future of Canada, Paper
Presented at the Austin-Hempel Lecture at Dalhousie University 6 (March 23-24, 1995).
65. MICHAEL KEATING, NATIONS AGAINST THE STATE: THE NEW POLITICS OF NA-
TIONALISM IN QUEBEC, CATALONIA AND SCOTLAND 84 (2001).
66. Id. at 85-86.





sion of women from the negotiating table, and the primacy given by the
Agreement to native culture and traditions over gender equality rights.
Charlottetown gained further opposition from Indian chiefs' caution
about the possible erosion of treaty rights. ° In Quebec, the "Canadian
clause" insistence on the "equality of provinces" re-awakened an ever
present resentment which would re-emerge whenever Quebec was
treated as a province just like the others. In the October 26, 1992 Refer-
endum on the Charlottetown Agreement, Quebec and the rest of Canada
(commonly referred to as ROC) voted "no" for opposite reasons."
The October 30, 1995 Referendum on Quebec's sovereignty was
lost by only 52, 448 votes which allowed for a 1.12 percent majority for
the "no." 72 The substantial increase in the number of people backing
sovereignty, however, confirmed the strength of the Quebecois national-
ist movement and is currently forcing the Canadian federal government
to find a solution to Quebec's claims.73 In Gagnon's words, "attempts at
reducing Quebecois to the status of one minority among others in Can-
ada simply denies the fact that Quebec forms one of the main pillars
upon which Canada was established in the Confederation agreement of
1867. '7
The relationship between Quebec and the Canadian federal State il-
lustrates the dynamic character of federation. Change is intrinsic to
federation as a political arrangement which is not only based upon re-
specting diversity but which also acknowledges its non-permanent
nature.
VI. DENIAL AND REPRESSION
There is a fundamental qualitative shift between the meaning and
implications of the three political scenarios we have just analyzed and
the study of what I shall refer to as "denial and repression." Through
cultural recognition, political autonomy and federalism, the State ac-
knowledges varying degrees of internal difference. These options may
70. Id.
71. Id.
72. CHIEF ELECTORAL OFFICER OF QUEBEC, RAPPORT PRELIMINAIRE DES R9SULTATS
DU DtPOUILLEMENT DES VOTES LE SOIR DU SCRUTIN: RIFERENDUM DU 30 OCTOBRE 1995 3
(1995).
73. For a thorough analysis of the implications of a new Quebec-Canada partnership
beyond the Plan B's hard line toward Quebec or on the contingency strategy of a Plan C in
the event of Quebec's secession in the near future. See ROGER GIBBINS & Guy LAFOREST,
BEYOND THE IMPASSE TOWARD RECONCILIATION (1998).
74. Alain G. Gagnon, From Nation-State to Multinational State: Quebec and Canada
facing the challenge of modernity, keynote speech delivered before the British Association of
Canadian Studies 16 (April 12, 1996).
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not fully satisfy the aspirations of the nations without States concerned
in each case; however, there is a tremendous difference between the
struggle for further recognition and the fight to defend the right to exist.
Denial concerns the State's refusal to acknowledge the existence of
any sort of cultural, historical or political national minorities within it-
self. In this situation, internal diversity is ignored, and assimilation is
actively encouraged. The State imposes a unique language, culture, and
institutions, which are presented as the only ones that both exist and can
exist within the State's territory. Any remaining cultural or linguistic
difference is portrayed as a regional characteristic, as a sign of the past,
and given a folklore status. In this section I focus on the analysis of two
particular cases: the homogenizing policies implemented by the French
State in the period leading to its consolidation as a modern nation-state,
and the active repression endured by Kurdish people.
A. France: Linguistic Homogenization and the
Consolidation of the Nation-State
The defense of a unitary State with a strong tendency to homogenize
its population was a common feature of most nation-states in their foun-
dational moment. At that particular time, States struggled to eliminate
internal difference and to turn themselves into political institutions that
sought to create cultural and emotional links among its citizens. France
is a case in point. Immediately after the French Revolution, decrees
were translated into the major dialects and languages spoken in the terri-
tory of the French State. The First French Republic (1792), involved a
change in attitude directed at establishing one people, one nation, and
one language. 5 In 1793 l'abb Gr6goire presented his rapport about the
need and means to universalize the use of French to the Convention's
Committee of Public Instruction. According to him, only three million
people, out of a total population of twenty-six million, could speak cor-
rectly the "national" language, that is French, while the percentage of
those able to write in French was still lower.76 In Citron's view, the Third
French Republic (1870-1940) played a crucial role in the process of
"'francisation" of the French people." Jules Ferry created a free, com-
pulsory and laic school system that promoted French language, history,
and values. At school, the use of patois was strictly forbidden and "se-
verely punished."78 Citron writes: "the leaders of the Third Republic,
heirs of the revolutionaries, were like them, impermeable to the idea of
75. SUZANNE CITRON, L'HISTOIRE DE FRANCE: AUTREMENT 140-43 (1992).
76. Id. at 142.




a possible existence of cultures other than their own in France. '79 At the
same time, gallicization involved the imposition of a certain image of
France as a "single and indivisible nation" through the teaching of a uni-
fied history that left aside the particular histories of the peoples included
within the French Republic. °
As Graff mentions, with the spirit of national linguistic development
and increased intolerance of dialect, class differences in language and
literacy were reinforced.8' Resistance did not prevent linguistic change.
The power of the State to impose a language and expand it through a
school system was the key to initiating the slow decay of minority lan-
guages and dialects. French represented the advance of civilization and
progress, and its use in "urban and white-collar work, armed-forces
training, and the growing volume of print materials stimulated the in-
crease in French speaking, reading and writing in the countryside."82
Similar policies were implemented in nineteenth-century Prussia, where
Bismarck expanded the Prussian school system into the Polish regions
of Poznan and Silesia and allowed only the German language as a me-
dium of instruction.83
The states' rejection of linguistic diversity and the imposition of a
single "national" language by making it necessary and compulsory to
get by in ordinary life has several major consequences: (1) the folklori-
zation of minority languages by restricting their use to festive or literary
contexts in which they are portrayed as signs of cultural difference, but
not as everyday markers of national identity;H (2) the perception of mi-
nority languages as having a lower status, which is directly connected to
restrictions in their use; (3) the progressive lack of interest in the culti-
vation of minority languages, not only as part of a high culture but also
in everyday use, because of which public and private utilization of the
language tends to decrease; (4) the labeling of the minority language as
a remnant of the past, as a sign of backwardness and even resistance to
modernization; and (5) the portrayal of the desire to maintain a language
other than the official one as an indication of betrayal of the State and to
one's own fellow countrymen and women.
Denial involves exclusion of the minority language and culture from
the State's school system, sentencing them to a slow and to a somehow
79. Id.
80. Id.
81. HARVEY J. GRAFF, THE LEGACIES OF LITERACY 277 (1987).
82. Id.
83. See JAMES BOWEN, HISTORY OF WESTERN EDUCATION: THE MODERN WEST
EUROPE AND THE NEW WORLD 3 (1981).
84. Sahlins refers to this particular point in exploring the use of the Catalan language
north of the Pyrenees, see PETER SAHLINS, BOUNDARIES: THE MAKING OF FRANCE AND
SPAIN IN THE PYRENEES 289 (1989).
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"natural" death. But for a language to become the vehicle of expression
of the most intimate emotions and feelings of a people, it takes more
than its expansion through the school system and its compulsory charac-
ter. It requires a long and complex process at the end of which people
should come to regard a particular language as their own and not as
something that has been imposed on them.
The association of a particular language with a certain superior
status is closely connected to the self-image of the nation-state it repre-
sents. The attachment of prestige and power to a specific language is
crucial to attain popular acceptance.
Denial is not only practiced by nation-states in the process of being
formed, as in post-Revolutionary France. There are contemporary States
that actively implement homogenization policies of various kinds. For
instance, Spain reversed its centralist homogenizing policy towards
Catalan, Basque and Galician in 1978 when a new constitution ac-
knowledged the need to recognize and guarantee the right to self-
determination of the nationalities and regions included within the Span-
ish State.85
B. The Kurds: The Repression of Difference
Often, the denial of difference is accompanied by measures directed
at the elimination of internal diversity. Repression has many faces, and
it ranges from mere socio-economic to political measures which may
include the use of force. To forbid a language and a culture, and to dis-
solve, wherever they already exist, the political institutions of a national
minority are common strategies employed by some States seeking to
annihilate internal diversity. The punishment of those who trespass the
state's laws regarding these matters is intended as a deterrent. Random
intimidation and attacks on members of the national minority seek to
destroy any kind of nationalist revival which could eventually turn into a
real threat to the state's integrity. The use of force stresses the power of
the State and the vulnerability of those subject to it. It also reveals the
state's inability to put forward its cause for homogenization by means
other than the use of force. Violence, which sometimes is publicly dis-
played while in other occasions it is used in a more surreptitious
fashion, reflects the absence of rational arguments and dialogue.
The intensity, frequency, and means applied to implement repres-
sion are likely to provoke divergent outcomes that are closely related to
the characteristics of the national minority in question. The degree of
national consciousness and the solidarity among the minority's mem-
bers is likely to increase during periods of repression when experiences
85. CONSTITucI6N [CE] art. 2 (Spain).
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of collective intimidation need to be constantly integrated into the po-
litical discourse of resistance. A pervasive and prolonged repression
usually undermines the national minority's capacity to resist and favors
its assimilation. Individuals' political resistance might be debilitated to
the point of extinction. On some occasions, individuals may even try to
hide their origin by fitting into the state's imposed pattern of what it
means to be a proper citizen: by speaking the state's language and being
attached to the state's culture and values. In contrasting cases, the state's
actions stimulate the emergence of active resistance movements, which
often respond to the state's violence against their community with
armed struggle.
The land the Kurds claim as their own stretches across five nation-
states: Iraq, Turkey, Syria, Iran and Armenia. There are an estimated
twenty-three million Kurds. 6 After the First World War and the conse-
quent dismantling of the Ottoman empire, the Kurds were promised a
State (Treaty of S~vres, 1920);17 however, the influence of Woodrow
Wilson's principle of the self-determination of peoples was to be forgot-
ten when the Treaty of Lausanne (1923) determining the new borders of
Turkey was ratified.88 The Kurds have always been regarded as a threat
to the modern Turkish state founded by Kemal Atatirk. Guided by
Atatdrk's nationalism, Turkey attempted the forcible assimilation of
Kurds. As Ignatieff writes, "they were denied the right to speak their
own language, educate their children in it or even call themselves
Kurds.!' 9 In Zubaida's words, "Turkey has maintained a stubborn denial
of Kurdish identity and has severely suppressed cultural and linguistic
expressions of Kurdishness." 90 In 1984 the Kurdish Worker's Party's
leader, Abdullah Ocalan, declared war on the Turkish government and
demanded independence. Guerrilla activity was resumed in southeastern
Turkey. "A very dirty war began," O'Ballance writes, "and atrocities
were committed by both sides."9'
The Kurds were also regarded as a tribal and backward people by
the modernizing nationalism of the Shah of Iran. Their condition as
Sunni Muslims, while most Iranians were Shias, contributed to a mar-
ginalization which acquired an even darker side after the fundamentalist
86. EDGAR O'BALLANCE, THE KURDISH STRUGGLE 1920-94 xxi (1996).
87. Id. at xxii.
88. Id.
89. MICHAEL IGNATIEFF, BLOOD AND BELONGING 136 (1993).
90. Sami Zubaida, Introduction, in THE KURDS: A CONTEMPORARY OVERVIEW (Philip
Kreyenbroek & Stefan Sperl eds., 1992).
91. O'BALLANCE, supra note 86, at xi.
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revolution of the Ayatollahs in 1979.92 Violence has often been employed
against Kurdish villages inside the enclave. 93
The history of Kurdish repression in Iraq since the 1970s, when
Saddam Hussein came to power, is a long, violent and complicated one
in which internal Kurdish differences have been exploited by both the
Iraqi and the Turkish governments. Anticipating Saddam Hussein's de-
feat in the Gulf War, a Kurdish popular uprising occurred in Iraq in
1991.94 Hussein retaliated causing a mass exodus of Kurds who sought
refuge in remote mountains, and in Turkey and Iran. The creation of the
enclave of Kurdistan in 1991 responded to the first United Nations at-
tempt to "protect a minority against the genocidal intentions of its
nominal ruler."95 The enclave of Kurdistan is not a State, it has no flag of
its own and it is not even allowed to call itself Kurdistan. Technically,
the enclave remains a part of Iraq and is protected by forces which set
up an air exclusion zone north of the 36th parallel.
When U.S. and British troops invaded Iraq in Gulf War II, the Kurds
of Iraq supported them with the aim of removing Saddam Hussein from
power. The Kurds sought to create some type of autonomous region, or
an independent Kurdish State, in the areas where they form a majority.
At the time of writing, the Kurdish struggle continues and no permanent
settlement has been arranged.
VII. CONCLUSION: MAJOR QUESTIONS AND DILEMMAS
FOR NATIONS WITHOUT STATES
In the West, nations without States find themselves living within
radically different political scenarios ranging from cultural recognition
to political autonomy and federation. In some extreme cases they are
subject to repression and prevented from developing their own specific
cultures and languages. The degree of national consciousness among
different members of nations without States is also subject to substantial
variations which have a direct influence on the strength and intensity of
different nationalist movements. Besides, there are remarkable varia-
tions among the attitudes of distinct states toward the national minorities
they contain. Yet, the sanctioning of democracy as a guiding principle
by a particular State should, in principle, favor some kind of recognition
of its internal diversity, except, we should bear in mind that democracy
can be interpreted in a disparate manner which may lead to the imple-
92. IGNATIEFF, supra note 89, at 136.
93. Id. at 137.




mentation of substantially different policies concerning intra-state cul-
tural differences.
The existence of a committed "potential intelligentsia" is crucial in
the activation and consolidation of the nationalist movement. Its mem-
bers should be able to construct a discourse critical of the State and be
ready to search, cultivate, and even invent common memories, values,
myths and symbols whose aim would be to generate, where it is absent,
or increase, where it already exists, the individuals' degree of national
consciousness. Turning a small elite into a mass movement including
people from different backgrounds is the major challenge faced by na-
tions without States and an indispensable condition if their nationalist
movements are to succeed.
In my view, the future significance of nations without States and
their chances to become new global political actors depend upon two
main factors: their economic viability and their capacity to provide indi-
viduals with a strong sense of identity. Economic viability is
indispensable since it is very hard for nations without States to demand
further autonomy or independence when they are economically depend-
ent on the States which include them. The threat of substantial cuts in
state subsidies may act as a deterrent to those who otherwise would be
happy for its nation to enjoy further autonomy. The passion awakened
by nationalism can certainly be cooled by a state of affairs in which
people feel deprived. The economic prosperity of Catalonia and its con-
dition as a major contributor to the Spanish coffer from which it
receives significantly less than it contributes, is one of the major argu-
ments employed by Catalan nationalists calling for greater autonomy. In
a highly competitive world, nations without States need to specialize
and offer high quality products or services based upon high standards.
There are other cases in which nationalist movements have emerged
in deprived areas. Corsican nationalism is a case in point. In these cir-
cumstances, nationalists tend to provide an explanation for the nation's
backwardness by blaming the State. The argument for further autonomy
or independence rests on the need to break free from a State which is
portrayed as a source of constraint for the nation's development. In such
areas, state subsidies are poor, non-existent, or considered as insuffi-
cient. Secession is often presented as the only feasible alternative for the
nation's survival.
I argue that nations without States are faced with three main dilem-
mas: (1) how to deal with internal diversity; (2) how to avoid violence
as a strategy to achieve further autonomy and recognition; and(3) how to
avoid the creation of an expensive bureaucratic machine adding a further
layer of government to an already saturated political structure.
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First, one of the major causes of intra-state conflict stems from the
nation-state's tendency to neglect its internal diversity and impose a set
of homogenizing policies aimed at favoring the emergence of a single
united nation under the auspices of a centralized political institution, the
State. Most nation-states have failed to acknowledge the resilience of
national and ethnic identities co-existing within its boundaries other
than the one they were aiming to impose. This line of action has
prompted innumerable conflicts creating resentment and dissatisfaction
among national and ethnic minorities elsewhere.
Nation-states enjoy varying degrees of power and act according to
different structural principles. Yet while some of them have opted for the
forced assimilation or even the annihilation of their national minorities,
others have chosen to confer on them diverse degrees of recognition. At
the same time, while some nations without States have remained silent,
buried under the pressure exerted by the State, others have more or less
disappeared, their languages and cultures being reduced to a minority
status that seriously threatens their survival, and a few have generated
potent nationalist movements defending their right to participate in the
governance of their own communities.
At present, we observe the flourishing of nationalism in nations
without States. However, due to the transnational circulation of people,
culture and financial resources, these nations are confronted with a ma-
jor challenge, this is their increasing internal diversity. At the dawn of a
new millennium, nations without States should seek imaginative and
democratically based alternatives to permit cultural coexistence and at
the same time encourage a sufficient degree of civic coherence. In my
view, they should aim to promote their own culture and language in the
public domain while favoring diversity in the private sphere. This is an
extremely delicate matter since most nations without States feel the le-
gitimate need to engage in the active "nationalization" of the nation.
Often, they have to reverse years of forced assimilation, resist the pow-
erful influences of the state's media, and the unstoppable advancement
of a global culture which speaks with an American accent. Yet, there is
only one way out if further conflict and resentment are to be averted.
Ethnic differences in nations without States have to be respected and
this has to be the product of a mutual compromise; that is, in practical
terms, those who respect others should be respected.
Ethnically distinct people living within a nation other than their own
should be welcomed into the host society and allowed to maintain their
own cultures and languages, but they should also be expected to engage
in a collective project able to unite all the members of the nation. The
political engagement of diverse people living within the same nation
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should be based not upon a shared origin, but on shared values and prin-
ciples involving the construction of an open society, endowed with
democratic, efficient and accountable institutions. The commitment to
civic values should operate as a source of cohesion and solidarity among
otherwise diverse and free individuals who, as members of the nation,
should be recognized as bearers of individual as well as collective
rights.
To reach a state of affairs in which individuals share democratic
principles and values concerning the type of society they want to live in
and regard the institutions governing them as legitimate is not an easy
task. Yet it seems to me the only alternative to the challenges posed by a
world characterized by an increasing socio-political fragmentation
stemming from cultural misunderstandings and confrontation between
cultures struggling not to be swept away by the tide of globalization.
These are some of the most difficult questions to be answered: How can
we preserve and promote a decaying culture and language which has
been neglected by lack of resources? How can we preserve a culture and
enhance the use of a language wherever a particular nation has received
a large number of migrants who, because of the marginalization to
which the national culture was condemned at the time of their arrival,
did not feel either the need or the wish to appropriate it and make it part
of their own identity? How can we harmonize the nationalist claims of a
nation without state such as Quebec with similar claims on behalf of the
Native nations inhabiting its territory?
A second dilemma faced by nations without States concerns the
strategies chosen by their nationalist movements in order to advance
their goals. Such strategies are closely related to the political ideologies
held by such movements. Hence, the acceptance of democracy as a
guiding principle should discourage the use of violence and favor the
emergence of social movements determined to advance their goals
through dialogue and participation in democratic channels.
Specific socio-political and historical circumstances influence the
decision of some groups to turn to violence as a means to attract interna-
tional attention and hopefully promote their goals. It should be stressed
that political terrorism has more often than not proved to be an unsuc-
cessful device in the struggle for self-determination. Whenever identity
is constructed upon the portrayal of the other as a potential enemy, vio-
lence against ethnic minorities living within the nation's territory is
likely to emerge. Building up an identity upon the belief of one's group
superiority above others is bound to generate feelings of hatred which
can easily turn into xenophobia and racism. At present, there are many
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circumstances in which nationalist arguments are mixed with racist and
xenophobic elements.
In the recent past, non-democratic forms of nationalism have
brought destruction and suffering to Bosnia, Croatia, Serbia, Chechnya,
East Timor, Kosovo and Rwanda, among many other countries. In all
these situations, nationalist arguments have been employed as detona-
tors of civil and international wars, ethnic cleansing, oppression and the
annihilation of peoples.
Nations without States, to flourish and prosper, need to build up
their nationalist discourses upon solid democratic principles stressing
the richness and value of diversity and encouraging respect for the dif-
ferent. Only then, can nations without States overcome what I consider
one of the nation-state's main flaws, this is the failure to accommodate
national and ethnic differences within its borders.
A third dilemma faced by emerging nations without States refers to
the need to avoid the genesis of a heavy and expensive bureaucratic ma-
chine which would seriously undermine their efficiency and pose a
burden to their economic viability. In the near future, nations without
States are bound to exist along with changing classical nation-state
structures and newly created supranational organizations. There is a risk
of unnecessary duplication of bureaucracy which can only be averted if
subsidiarity is taken seriously and a serious re-structuring of the distinct
functions for which each political institution is made responsible takes
place.
Subsidiarity refers to the political principle that establishes that de-
cisions should be taken as close to the citizens as possible. Subsidiarity
is based upon the decentralization of power and it primarily refers to the
process by means of which the State devolves power to the regions and
local governments. But it also applies to regional governments being
able to put into practice their own decentralization.
Subsidiarity is favored by a communication technology which per-
mits an almost immediate flow of information between traditional
centers of power and regional decision-making institutions. It could be
argued that subsidiarity is encouraged because, although decisions
might be taken miles away from traditional centers of power, these can
still exert a tight control upon them due to the highly sophisticated tech-
nology that permits the storage, selective use, and immediate access to
information being generated in distant localities.
Subsidiarity consists of applying, interpreting, and developing these
particular rules to specific scenarios. One of the main advantages of opt-
ing for a system based upon subsidiarity resides in the fact that the
individuals who are going to take the decisions have a much closer ex-
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perience of the problems to solve, know better the people's needs, aspi-
rations and limitations, and almost invariably they belong to the
communities within which they are operating. Yet, they are not regarded
as alien by community-members.
A further advantage of subsidiarity is its proven capacity to enable
people to take a more active part in the life of their community. Subsidi-
arity empowers individuals and stimulates their creative capacity, they
feel as actors with specific tasks to accomplish and are endowed with
the power to decide upon a limited number of issues.
In my view, to work, subsidiarity requires three main conditions: ef-
ficiency, trust and legitimacy.
Decentralization to be efficient has to avoid the duplication of bu-
reaucracy that is often frequent whenever there is an attempt to apply
the subsidiarity principle. People will feel that subsidiarity is positive if
the institutions generated by it are efficient, that is, they identify the
problems, seek and work to eradicate their causes, and promptly re-
spond to the citizens' needs. Matters devolved should be dealt with by a
single layer of officials and civil servants, otherwise subsidiarity is noth-
ing more than a very expensive fiction.
Trust is essential for subsidiarity to work. Trust operates in two
ways: downwards from the institutions which opt for decentralization to
regional and local institutions; and upwards from the newly created or
empowered institutions to state or supranational institutions which de-
cide which functions are to be devolved. The agents involved in a
subsidiarity structure need to trust each other about the common princi-
ples and values that inform their actions. Central institutions should
regard subsidiarity as a furthering of democracy. Devolved institutions
should employ their newly acquired power and resources to the ad-
vancement of their communities within the framework set up by
decentralization, being aware that the strongest arguments for subsidiar-
ity stem from its efficiency, cost-effectiveness and identification of the
people with their regional institutions and rulers. Subsidiarity is impos-
sible wherever political actors do not trust each other and do not share a
core of principles, values and objectives which guarantee their cohesion.
If this is the case, then subsidiarity leads to nothing else but fragmenta-
tion and hostility.
Once subsidiarity is adopted as a principle for political organization,
it is crucial that the people regard the institutions and individuals who
work in them as legitimate. The key condition of legitimacy is that peo-
ple feel represented by the democratically elected rulers of the devolved
government and institutions. Legitimacy has to prove effective and this
brings us back to the requirement for efficiency mentioned above.
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Transparency and accountability in decisionmaking processes and its
subsequent implementation are vital to guarantee an efficient and cost
effective application of the subsidiarity principle. The future of nations
without states to a great extent depends upon the acceptance and suc-
cessful implementation of subsidiarity. The fulfillment of the three main
conditions I have just outlined points to some of the major challenges to
be faced by nation states in their quest for recognition as political actors.
